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The canonical bargaining game in economics is the ultimatum game, played by tens of 
thousands of students around the world over the past three decades.  In the ultimatum game, first 
studied by Werner Guth, Rolf Schmittberger, and Bernd Schwarze (1982), the “proposer” 
proposes how to split a pie between herself and a “responder.”  Then the responder decides 
whether to accept or reject this proposal.  If the responder accepts, then the proposal is 
implemented; otherwise, both players receive nothing.  For players motivated purely by 
monetary considerations, the standard subgame-perfect equilibrium solution implies that the 
proposer receives almost all of the money.  In this manner, the ultimatum game represents a 
stylized glimpse into the underpinnings of decision-making at the heart of economics.  For 
instance, a monopolist setting a price, a monopsonist setting a wage, or more generally any 
bargaining situation that has a take it or leave it element. 
The ultimatum game is frequently presented as the quintessential game that displays the 
importance of non-monetary components of utility in driving behavior away from predictions of 
standard economic theory.  The usual findings are that proposers often make offers that are close 
to an equal split of the pie, and that low offers are frequently rejected by responders.  The 
behavior of the responders in particular has been puzzling to economists, and different models of 
social preferences have been put forward to explain such actions.  Clearly, rejecting a positive 
offer in the ultimatum game involves a monetary cost, and whether behavior changes when this 
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cost increases is an immediate question.  Many people’s intuition is that, while responders will 
be willing to reject unequal offers when their cost is low, a large enough offer should make it too 
costly to reject.  Many of us might be willing to reject an offer of 1% of ten dollars; yet how 
many of us would reject 1% of ten million dollars? 
Notwithstanding this intuition, one reliable result in the literature is that respondents do not 
markedly change their behavior as the stakes increase (Robert Slonim and Alvin E. Roth (1998), 
Lisa A. Cameron (1999), Bertrand Munier and Costin Zaharia (2003)).  Cameron (1999) reports, 
for example, that “the persistence of rejections at high stakes does however raise the question of 
how high the stakes need to be to complete the reversion to Nash equilibrium.”  Indeed, it is an 
open empirical question whether people respond at all to liberal stakes changes in bargaining, 
trust, or gift-exchange games conducted in the laboratory—that is, whether liberal changes in 
stakes have any bearing on actions over any stakes range in this class of games (see, e.g., Steven 
D. Levitt and John A. List (2007)).  This is an important debate because where economics 
provides its most basic predictions revolves around how people should respond to changes in 
incentives—pecuniary or non-pecuniary (Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, (2000))—not whether 
subjects have fairness, spite, or altruistic proclivities.   
In terms of the ultimatum game, one challenging issue for the literature is the lack of 
information on how responders react to low proportional offers in high stakes games.  This is 
because proposers stubbornly insist on offering non-trivial fractions of the pie when playing the 
game, presenting difficulties in testing the response to unfair offers in high stakes games.  For 
example, only 4 of 250 offers were less than 20% of the pie in the high stakes treatment in 
Slonim and Roth (1998).  Likewise, in Cameron (1999) only 2 of 29 offers were less than 20% of 
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the pie.  This also causes difficulty in measuring stake effects with great precision.  Consider 
Slonim and Roth (1998), which to date represents the premier study exploring ultimatum games 
over considerable stakes ranges.  If one considers data across all stakes levels, Slonim and Roth 
only observe 10 offers out of 820 offers that are less than 10% of the pie, with none of these 
offers in the high stakes treatment, making it impossible to measure stake effects for such low 
offers.  In Cameron’s data, only 5 out of 178 offers are below 10% of the pie, and only one of 
these is in the high stakes condition.   
In this paper, we overcome these challenges by designing an experiment that admits 
sufficient information on low offers and simultaneously provides large variation in stakes.  The 
setting we use is poor villages in Northeast India.  Within these villages, we execute an 
experiment that is unique in two ways.  First, we increase the stakes by a factor of 1000, which is 
considerably higher than those used in earlier experiments—permitting us to explore bargains 
from 20 rupees to 20,000 rupees (1.6 hours of work to 1600 hours of work).  Second, by use of 
specific language in the experimental instructions, our design successfully elicits low offers from 
proposers over all stakes levels, making it possible to measure stake effects precisely over large 
stakes changes.  
We report several results.  First, our design worked across all stakes levels:  the median offer 
was 20% of the pie, and the 95% confidence interval was 2.5% - 50% of the pie.  Interestingly, 
while the offer proportions are significantly lower in the higher stakes treatments compared to 
the lowest stakes treatment, the actual amount offered increases as stakes increase.  Second, 
among responders we find a considerable effect of stakes:  while at low stakes we observe 
rejections in the range of the extant literature, in the highest stakes condition we observe only a 
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single rejection out of 24 responders.  Third, we also explore how changes in wealth (earned 
during the experiment) affect behavior.  The potential importance of wealth effects is frequently 
mentioned in multi-round laboratory experiments; however, it is difficult to disentangle the 
effect of wealth from learning in such settings.  We assign subjects randomly into one of two 
conditions: those who start with zero wealth, and those who have non-zero wealth at the time of 
participation in the ultimatum game.  We do not find a significant wealth effect for proposers or 
responders, although we do find that rejection rates are lower among subjects with no initial 
wealth, consonant with a small wealth effect in the intuitive direction. 
The remainder of our study proceeds as follows.  The next section describes our design.  
Section 3 contains a discussion of the experimental results.  Section 4 concludes. 
II. Experimental Design and Procedures 
The study was conducted in eight villages at different locations in the state of Meghalaya in 
Northeast India.  A total of 458 responders and an equal number of proposers participated in the 
experiment.  Each participant played the game only once—either as a proposer or as a responder.  
Proposer and responders were randomized into one of eight treatment cells, displayed in Table I.  
Table I shows our 2x4 factorial design:  two wealth conditions by four stakes levels.  A total of 
136 subjects were assigned to the no-wealth condition, whereas 322 subjects had positive wealth 
when they played the ultimatum game.  Our “No-Wealth” subjects participated only in the 
ultimatum game, and only had earnings from this game.  Our “Wealth” subjects had earnings 
from unrelated prior tasks.1
                                                          
1 These earnings ranged from 37 to 1280 Rupees, with a mean of 493 Rupees. Using actual wealth rather than a 
wealth dummy does not change the conclusions of our analysis. 
   
4 
 
We varied stakes from 20 to 20,000 Indian Rupees, in four cells:  20, 200, 2,000 and 20,000 
Indian Rupees.  At the time of the experiment, these amounts roughly corresponded to $0.41, 
$4.1, $41, and $410.2
Table I contains the sample sizes in each of the eight treatments.  Although working within a 
poor community permits our experimental budget to cover many more high stakes observations, 
this alone might not tremendously help the power of testing the null hypothesis of interest if little 
information is obtained over small relative offers.  Of course, this is exactly what is necessary to 
  In the villages where the experiments were conducted, 100 Rupees 
represented roughly a day’s wage for the average villager.  This choice of stakes permits us to 
bracket the literature and go beyond the stakes level used to explore our major hypotheses of 
interest.  For example, Slonim and Roth’s (1998) highest stakes level is 62.5 hours of wages, 
with the lower stakes levels being 12.5 and 2.5 hours of work.  If we take a day’s work to be 8 
hours, our middling stakes conditions of 200 Rupees would be 16 hours of work and 2,000 
Rupees is 160 hours of work, which effectively brackets Slonim and Roth’s (1998) stakes 
conditions. We should also note that this is a conservative estimate, since most villages have 
some level of underemployment. In a related survey we conducted in these villages, the average 
reported yearly income was 17000 Rps, so our large stakes treatment is a little over a year’s 
income, and 2000 Rps make nearly one and a half month’s income.  Similarly, Cameron’s (1999) 
highest stakes treatment corresponds to three months of expenditures.  If we assume expenditures 
equal income, this level of stakes computes to roughly 600 hours of work, which is effectively 
bracketed by our stakes. 
                                                          
2 The total amount paid to participants was approximately $16,000; the cost of the high stakes treatment was 
$12,000, which played a role in limiting our sample size in this treatment cell. 
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test how stakes affect the response to unfair offers, and explore whether individuals are stake 
sensitive over the entire offer domain.   
To elicit a significant number of low offers, we used standard ultimatum game instructions 
with one twist.  We added a specific message in the experimental instructions for proposers.3
Notice that if the responder’s goal is to earn as much money as possible from the 
experiment, he/she should accept any offer that gives him/her positive earnings, no 
matter how low. This is because the alternative is to reject, in which case he/she will not 
receive any earnings. If the responder is expected to behave in this way and accept any 
positive offer, a proposer should offer the minimum possible amount to the responder in 
order to leave the experiment with as much money as possible. That is, if the responder 
that you are matched with aims to earn as much money as possible, he/she should accept 
any offer that is greater than zero. Given this, making the offer that gives the lowest 
possible earnings to the responder will allow you to leave the experiment with as much 
money possible. 
   
This frame informs proposers that the rational decision, if both parties aim to maximize 
earnings, is to offer the lowest possible amount (see the Appendix for the verbatim instructions4
                                                          
3 An alternative approach could have been to use the strategy method in which responders are asked to state their 
choices for every possible proposal.  We chose not to use the strategy method because we believe such an approach 
potentially places subjects on an artificial margin.  It remains an open empirical question as to whether the strategy 
method induces behavioral differences in the ultimatum game (see Jordi Brandts and Gary Charness (2009)). 
).  
In light of the experimental results on the power of messages, cues, and framing, we expected 
this addition to shift the offer distribution downwards for every stakes conditions. This would 
effectively permit us exogenous variation that includes considerable mass at low offers.  The 
4 The actual instructions were given in the local language, Khasi. 
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instructions used for responders were standard, and taken directly from the experimental 
literature. 
Before moving to a discussion of the experimental results, we should briefly mention a few 
other experimental particulars.  First, each subject only played the game once—either making an 
offer or responding to an offer.  Second, subjects responded to offers that were made by 
proposers from the same village, except for 45 responders in the 20-rupee condition, who were 
presented with offers that were made by proposers from another village, to which we returned to 
make proper payment to avoid deception.  The response to these offers was not different from 
the offers made by proposers from the same village, which makes sense since none of the 
responders were told of the geographic location of their partner proposer.  We therefore pool the 
data in our analysis below.     
III. Results 
A. Proposer behavior 
A first consideration revolves around whether our design successfully elicited low offers.  
Figure 1 shows the mean proportional offer across the different stakes treatments, whereas 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of proportional offers for each stakes level.  The figures confirm 
that the design was able to elicit low proportional offers for all four stakes conditions.  In our 
aggregate data, for example, approximately 88% of the offers are less than 30% of the pie.  This 
is much lower than the average offer of 40% reported in the literature (Hessel Oosterbeek, 
Randolph Sloof, and Gijs Van de Kuilen (2004, p. 176)).   
7 
 
In this spirit, we observe 20% of offers less than 10% of the pie, 28% between 10% and 20% 
of the pie, and 40% of the offers between 20% and 30% of the pie.  By means of comparison, the 
influential work of Slonim and Roth (1998) and Cameron (1999) had only 7% and 15% of the 
offers between 0 and 30% of the pie.  Furthermore, there is considerable variation in the lower 
tail of even the high stakes treatments.  For instance, in the 20,000 Rp treatment, we observe 12 
offers of 5% of the pie or lower; similar variability is observed in the 2,000 Rp treatment. 
Even though proposer behavior is not our main focus, there are interesting behavioral 
patterns in proposer behavior across stakes: pairwise two-sample t-tests by stakes reveal that 
offer proportions (offers as a percentage of the total pie to be divided) are significantly lower in 
the higher stakes treatments compared to the 20-rupee case (p=0.000 for 20 Rp. vs. 200 Rp., 
p=0.000 for 200 Rp. vs. 2,000 Rp., and p=0.0002 for 20 Rp. vs. 20,000 Rp).  This finding is 
consistent with the literature, although the negative marginal effect that we obtain is larger than 
what was found in previous work (see Oosterbeek, Sloof, and Van de Kuilen (2004) for a 
review).  Our results reveal that offer proportions are declining significantly with the first and 
second 10-fold increase in stakes.  The third 10-fold increase only marginally, and 
insignificantly, lowers the mean offer proportion.  Our results also show that the actual amount 
offered increases as stakes increase, from a median of 5 Rps in the 20 rupee case, to 30, 200 and 
1500 in the 200, 2000 and 20000 Rps cases, respectively.  Proposer wealth has an insignificant 
effect on the proportion offered, at all stakes levels.  
B. Responder behavior 
A first observation to make about responder behavior is that unconditional rejection rates 
decrease as stakes increase.  Table II shows rejection rates across stakes and initial wealth.  
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Using all data from all levels of stakes reveals that rejection rates significantly differ across 
stakes; both for subjects who started with zero wealth (p=0.005) and for subjects who started 
with positive wealth (p=0.038) using a Fisher’s exact test.  In the pooled data (across wealth), 
pairwise two-sample tests of proportions across stakes show that rejection rates are not 
significantly different between 20 Rupees and 200 Rupees (p=0.24) or between 20 and 2,000 
Rupees (p=0.11), but that the frequency of rejection is significantly lower with 20000 Rupees 
than 20 Rupees (p=0.002). Likewise, the difference between 200 and 2,000 Rupees and 200 and 
20,000 Rupees, and the difference between 2,000 and 20,000 Rupees are significant (p=0.015, 
and p=0.001, and p=0.014).  
Figure 3 complements Table II by showing the predicted rejection probability, obtained from 
a simple logistic regression of rejections on offered money in terms of days’ wages foregone.  As 
the figure shows, rejection rates fall and approach zero as the amount of money that must be 
foregone with a rejection increases.  In other words, the “demand curve” for punishing unfair 
offers is downward sloping—stake has its predicted effect.  The Figure also reveals that a fair 
amount of money needs to be on the table—30-40 days of wages or more—for the responders to 
accept low offers.  In this sense, with the offer distributions that we observe, the reversion to 
almost complete acceptance takes place somewhere between our 2,000 and 20,000 treatments. 
Focusing solely on aggregate rejection rates can be misleading, since the distribution of 
offers may change with stakes.  To gain deeper insights into responder behavior, we focus on 
unfair offers only, utilizing the fact that we have rich data on the response to low proportional 
offers at all stakes levels.  Figure 4 displays rejection rates across stakes for different 
proportional offer categories, and shows the power of stakes.  Statistically, the rejection rates for 
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the two highest stakes conditions are significantly different from the two lower stakes conditions 
in all three unfair offer ranges.  Overall, the figures and raw data suggest that proportionally 
equivalent offers are significantly less likely to be rejected with high stakes: for these unfair 
offers, people accept much more when playing with higher stakes.   
As a final piece of data analysis, we model responder behavior conditional on offer size and 
wealth using the following logistic regression model:  
(1)  reject=f(β0+ β1*wealth+ β2*stakes_2 + β3*stakes_3 + β4*stakes_4+ β5*proportion_offered)  
In the above logit regression, reject equals one if the offer is rejected, 0 otherwise, 
proportion_offered is the offer divided by the size of the pie, and stakes_2, stakes_3 and stakes_4 
are dummy variables for the stake levels, 200, 2,000, and 20,000 Rupees.  Wealth is a dummy 
variable that tracks whether the subject started with zero wealth or not.5  The baseline is the 20 
Rp stake treatment.  Regression results are given in Table III.  The 10-fold scale to 200 Rps does 
not decrease the average log odds of rejection, but at higher stakes, the log odds decline 
significantly. The proportion offered also has a significant negative effect on rejection.  While 
the coefficient of the wealth dummy is positive, meaning that subjects who had positive wealth 
were more likely to reject offers, the effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels.  
Overall, the empirical results in Table III are consistent with the raw data in that rejection rates 
decrease as the cost of rejection increases.6
                                                          
5 Using the actual amount of earned money and assuming linear log odds in earnings or log earnings does not 
change the results. 
   
6 In robustness testing, we explored several different specifications, including adding an interaction effect of the 
percentage offer by stakes condition.  The regression confirms the graphical representation in Figure 4: the marginal 
effect of offering one percent more in the high stake treatments is significantly different from the low stakes 
treatments. 
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IV. Concluding Remarks 
The ultimatum game has yielded perhaps the most robust experimental evidence to date:  by 
rejecting unfair offers, responders deviate from the strategy that would maximize their monetary 
earnings.  Further, stakes have not been found to predictably influence rejection behavior.  We 
combine an approach pioneered by Slonim and Roth (1998)—visiting a poor population to ease 
the constraint of using truly high stakes—with a design that elicits a number of proportionately 
low proposals to explore whether responders are influenced by large stake changes.  This 
approach represents perhaps the most difficult test to date of the persistence of the deviations 
from earnings-maximization on the part of responders.  
Our results lend support to Slonim and Roth’s (1998) suggestion that the inability to detect 
differences in single-play behavior in earlier studies is due to the practical difficulty of 
generating enough data on low offers in one-shot play.  Through our stakes treatments, we find 
that sufficiently high stakes leads responder behavior to converge almost perfectly to full 
acceptance of low offers, even in the absence of learning.  To our best knowledge, this study 
provides the first empirical support for the hypothesis of substantial stake effects in this game, 
and provides insights into what might happen in higher stakes games.  Of course, this result does 
not diminish the importance of the literature to date—we take part in lower stakes transactions in 
well-functioning markets every day.  Rather, it reveals that the demand curve for punishing 
unfair offers is downward sloping, and provides the first evidence that one of the most basic 
economic predictions—that people respond predictably to stake changes—arises in this game. 
Our study fits into a broader class of work exploring the effect of stakes on behavior in 
allocation games.  Early work examining behavior in dictator games showed that moving from 
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hypothetical to real incentives results in lower offers (Robert Forsythe et al. (1994)).  Studies 
published since have found some evidence that an increase in stakes leads to a less than 
proportionate increase in monies transferred (see, e.g., John A. List and Todd Cherry (2005), 
Jeffrey Carpenter, Eric Verhoogen, and Stephen Burks (2005)).  In Carpenter et al. (2005), for 
example, an increase in stakes from $10 to $100 caused the median offer to drop from 40% to 
20% of the endowment, though the average offer only dropped from 33% to 25%.  Yet, this 
result is much weaker for smaller changes in stakes: Todd Cherry, Peter Frykblom, and Jason 
Shogren (2002) find no perceptible differences in dictator offers across a $10 and $40 dictator 
game. 
In a related line of work, behavior in experiments allowing one player to punish another is in 
line with our comparative static results:  the amount spent on punishing another player goes up as 
the price of imposing that punishment decreases (see, e.g., Jeffrey Carpenter (2007), Martijn 
Egas and Arno Riedl (2008)).  In addition, some laboratory research shows that people are 
sensitive to the size of incentives when choosing to lie (Uri Gneezy (2005), Anna Dreber and 
Magnus Johannesson (2008), Matthias Sutter (2009)).  Yet, again, we should note that there is 
some evidence that the amount spent on punishing another player goes up when the punishment 
is less effective (Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr, and Urs Fischbacher (2005)).  This line of research is 
insightful, but more data collected in the extremes of the payoff space—both in levels and in 
distributions—is necessary to measure cleanly the effect of liberal changes in stakes on behavior.  
We hope that our approach is a stimulant for such work. 
Finally, one should keep in mind possible caveats associated with our experimental approach.  
On the one hand, it might be the case that our subjects are playing a game that we are not 
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modeling:  jointly, they are interested in taking as much money as possible from the 
experimenters.  In this way, rejection rates are pushed downwards.  Alternatively, experimental 
subjects might be confusing the “game of life” with the experimental setting.  For example, 
within the course of market interactions in the ‘extra-lab’ world, there is almost always a future 
or a reputation at stake, in particular in small villages.  In the case of the ultimatum game, such 
confusion may push participants toward rejecting low offers, because such offers are rejected 
automatically in the field, and this behavior spills over into the lab.   
While we believe that such insights hold merit when measuring levels of outcome variables, 
our experimental approach is designed to mitigate such factors.  First, our design revolves around 
measuring comparative static effects over liberal changes in stakes.  That is, we are less 
concerned about the levels of outcome measures; rather we focus our attention on the treatment 
effects of stakes and wealth.  Second, we used 8 distinct villages in our data gathering to avoid 
explicitly the chance of having the village effects interact with the treatment effects.  Since data 
across villages reveal similar behavioral patterns, we believe that our treatment effects apply 
more broadly.  Yet, of course, future replication studies should explore whether and to what 
extent our design choices influenced our empirical results.   
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Table I: Experimental Design Summary 
 20 Rps 200 Rps 2000 Rps 20000 Rps Total 
Wealth 173 74 63 12 322 
No wealth 28 50 46 12 136 
Total 201 124 109 24 458 
Notes: Figures in the table represent the number of observations in each treatment. Subjects in the “Wealth” 
treatment earned earnings in unrelated tasks before the ultimatum game. Subjects in the “No Wealth” treatment only 
participated in the Ultimatum Game task. 20, 200, 2000 and 20000 Rps represents our four stakes treatments, and 
denote the monetary amount to be bargained over in the Ultimatum game.  Each observation represents a bargaining 
“pair,” making the total number of subjects equal to 916. 
 
Table II: Rejection Rates by Wealth and Stakes 
 20 Rps 200 Rps 2000 Rps 20000 Rps All 
Wealth 34.68% 
[60] 
47.30% 
[35] 
33.33% 
[21] 
8.33% 
[1] 
36.34% 
[117] 
No Wealth  46.43% 
[13] 
36.00% 
[18] 
19.57% 
[9] 
0% 
[0] 
29.41% 
[40] 
All 36.32% 
[73] 
42.74% 
[53] 
27.52% 
[30] 
4.17% 
[1] 
34.28% 
[157] 
Notes: Figures in the table represent average rejection rates by treatment. Numbers in brackets are the number of 
actual offers rejected. Subjects in the “Wealth” treatment earned earnings in unrelated tasks before bargaining in the 
ultimatum game. Subjects in the “No Wealth” treatment only participated in the Ultimatum Game task. 20, 200, 
2000 and 20000 Rps represents our four stakes treatments, and denote the monetary amount to be bargained over in 
the Ultimatum game. 
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Table III. Logit Regression Results 
Independent variable  
Intercept -0.0772 
(0.321) 
 
Wealth   0.287 
(0.240) 
 
Stakes 2 0.152 
(0.250) 
 
Stakes 3 -0.640** 
(0.285) 
 
Stakes 4 -2.874*** 
(1.043) 
 
Proportion offered -3.166*** 
(0.898) 
 
N     458 
Notes: Dependent variable is whether the 
responder rejected the offer. Wealth (=1 if yes) is 
the indicator variable for subjects who earned 
wealth in unrelated tasks before the ultimatum 
game. Stakes 2, 3 and 4 are indicator variables 
equaling 1 if the responder participated in the 200, 
2000, and 20000 Rps treatments, respectfully. 
Proportion offered is the percentage share of the 
stakes offered in the Ultimatum Game.  Standard 
errors are in parentheses beneath the coefficient 
estimates. ***, ** and *’s denotes significance 
level of p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.1, respectively. 
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Notes: Figure shows average proportion of the stakes offered to the 
responder. Stakes represents our four stakes treatments of 20, 200, 2000 and 
20000 rupees to be shared in the Ultimatum Game.  
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Offer Proportion Across Stakes
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Notes: Figure shows the distribution of the pie offered to the responder in 
each stakes condition. Each graph represents one of our four stakes 
treatments of 20, 200, 2000 and 20000 rupees.  
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Notes: Figure represents the predicted rejection probabilities, obtained from a 
logistic regression of rejections on offered money in terms of days’ wages 
foregone. Dots represent the observed offered money by senders in the 
Ultimatum Game from which the predictions are made.  
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Notes: Figure reveals rejection rates by stakes for various levels of ‘unfair’ 
offers. Stakes represents our four stakes treatments of 20, 200, 2000, and 
20000 rupees to be bargained over in the Ultimatum Game. The top graph 
shows average rejection rates for offers made of less than or equal to 10 
percent of the pie; the middle chart shows rejection rates for offers made 
between 10 percent and 20 percent (including 20%) of the pie.  The bottom 
figure shows rejection rates for offers made between 20 percent and 30 
percent (including 30%) of the pie. N denotes the number of observations for 
each bar. 
22 
 
APPENDIX A: 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PROPOSERS: 
Welcome to this study of decision-making. The experiment will take about 15 minutes. The 
instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully, you can earn a considerable amount of 
money. All the money you earn is yours to keep, and will be paid to you, in cash, in private, after 
the experiment ends. Your confidentiality is assured. 
In this experiment, you have been assigned the role of “proposer”. You have been randomly 
matched with another participant who will be in the role of “responder”. Your earnings will 
depend on your decisions, as well as on the decisions of the responder.  
You will be asked to propose a split of a total of____ Rupees between yourself and the 
responder. That is, you will make an offer to the responder that specifies how much of the 
____Rupees you will receive and how much of the _____Rupees he/she will receive. 
The amount that your offer specifies for yourself can be anything from 0 to ____Rupees. Your 
earnings in the experiment will depend on whether or not the responder accepts your offer. If 
he/she accepts your offer, both you and the responder receive the amounts specified in your 
(accepted) offer. If he/she rejects your offer, both you and the responder will receive zero 
earnings for this experiment. 
Notice that if the responder’s goal is to earn as much money as possible from the experiment, 
he/she should accept any offer that gives him/her positive earnings, no matter how low. This is 
because the alternative is to reject, in which case he/she will not receive any earnings. If the 
responder is expected to behave in this way and accept any positive offer, a proposer should 
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offer the minimum possible amount to the responder in order to leave the experiment with as 
much money as possible. That is, if the responder that you are matched with aims to earn as 
much money as possible, he/she should accept any offer that is greater than zero. Given this, 
making the offer that gives the lowest possible earnings to the responder will allow you to leave 
the experiment with as much money possible. 
Now, please tell us your proposed split of the ___Rupees between yourself and the responder. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR RESPONDERS: 
Welcome to this study of decision-making. The experiment will take about 15 minutes. The 
instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully, you can earn a considerable amount of 
money. All the money you earn is yours to keep, and will be paid to you, in cash, in private, after 
the experiment ends. Your confidentiality is assured. In this experiment, you have been assigned 
the role of “responder”. You have been randomly matched with another participant who is in the 
role of the “proposer”. Your earnings will depend on your decisions, as well as on the decision of 
the proposer. 
The proposer has been asked to propose a split of ____ Rupees between him/her and you. That 
is, the proposer has made an offer that specifies how much of the total ____Rupees you will 
receive and how much of the _____Rupees he/she will receive.  
You can choose either to accept or to reject this offer. If you accept the offer, both you and the 
proposer receive the amounts specified in the offer. If you reject the offer, both you and the 
proposer will receive zero earnings for this experiment. 
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The proposer has offered that out of the total amount of ____Rupees, you receive ____Rupees 
and he/she receives ____ Rupees. 
Now, please tell us if you accept or decline this offer by the proposer. 
  
 
